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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the last season of the popular American sitcom Friends, two of the 
main characters, a married couple, discovered that they were infertile 
and decided to adopt a baby.  They were delighted to learn that a 
potential birth mother1 wanted to meet them, and then dismayed to learn 
that there had been a mix-up.  She thought they were another couple: a 
minister and a doctor.  The couple pretended to be what the birth mother 
expected, making up stories about their church and medical practice 
until the husband was overcome by guilt and confessed their deceit.  
Feeling betrayed, the birth mother attempted to leave, but the husband 
stopped her and apologized, explaining that they just wanted to be 
parents and that his wife was a wonderful mother without a child.  The 
birth mother accepted this explanation and agreed to place her baby with 
them.2  Throughout a series of episodes dealing with the adoption process, 
the show portrayed the infertile married couple as a loving pair who 
deserved a baby, and portrayed the birth mother as a sweet but 
scatterbrained girl who was unsure of the identity of the birth father.3
 1. The terms birth mother, birth father, birth parent, and birth relative are used 
throughout this Comment to refer to the biological relatives of a child placed for 
adoption.  Not all birth parents are comfortable with these terms because some feel that 
the terms minimize their role.  See, e.g., Diane Turski, Why Birthmother Means Breeder, 
http://www.exiledmothers.com/adoption_facts/Why_Birthmother_Means_Breeder.html 
(last visited June 26, 2007) (“‘[B]irthmother’ is simply a euphemism for ‘incubator’ or 
‘breeder.’”).  This Author understands and respects this position and intends no 
disrespect by the use of these terms.  Rather, the terms were selected because they are 
consistently used in the literature in this area, and are almost universally understood.  
The treatment of these terms as separate or compound words, “birth mother” versus 
“birthmother,” is inconsistent in the literature.  This Author has chosen the former 
because it allows for less common combinations like “birth relatives,” but has left 
compound uses intact when they appear in quotations from sources that favor that usage. 
 2. Friends: The One with the Birth Mother (NBC television broadcast Jan. 8, 
2004). 
 3. Id.; Friends: The One where Joey Speaks French (NBC television broadcast 
Feb. 19, 2004); Friends: The One with Rachel’s Going Away Party (NBC television 
broadcast Apr. 29, 2004); Friends: The Last One (NBC television broadcast May 6, 
2004). 
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At one level, this story is just another variation on the classic theme of 
mistaken identity followed by zany antics.4  At a deeper level, however, 
it may reflect the way society views the adults who are involved in 
adoption.5  That view seems to be that adopting parents are good people, 
and they are justified in doing whatever needs to be done to give a child 
a good home.  Birth parents, on the other hand, are foolish, immoral, or 
both, and it is okay to lie to them to get a child because the end goal of 
parenting is noble, and the child will be better off with the new family.  
To some extent these ideas also find expression in the adoption laws of 
this country,6 but over the last thirty years both this view and the laws 
governing adoption have been changing.7
One element of this change has been an increase in “open adoptions.”8  
Ironically, though, as birth parents have gained more power in selection  
 4. This is one of the oldest plot devices in comedy.  See, e.g., WILLIAM 
SHAKESPEARE, THE COMEDY OF ERRORS (T.S. Dorsch ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988). 
 5. See David Elkind, Adolescents, Parenting, and the Media in the Twenty-First 
Century, 4 ADOLESCENT MED. 599, 605 (1993) (arguing that media images “reflect and 
buttress” society’s changing views of the family).  There is some disagreement among 
sociologists as to whether society’s values influence television or vice versa.  For an 
interesting discussion of this topic, see Michael Morgan et al., Television and Family 
Values: Was Dan Quayle Right?, 2 MASS COMM. & SOC’Y 47 (1999). 
 6. See, e.g., In re Baby Boy M., 272 Cal. Rptr. 27, 32 n.3 (Ct. App. 1990) 
(criticizing trial judge’s praise of the “self-sacrifice” of adopting parents and 
condemnation of the morals of the birth parents).  Of course, the law has never permitted 
obvious fraud in this context, but it did afford adopting parents broad discretion in 
making decisions about the adopted child, even where those decisions conflicted with 
promises made to the birth parent.  For example: 
[A]doptive parents have the same right of custody and control of the child as if 
that child had been born to them and blood parents are relieved of all their 
legal duties and divested of all their legal rights in respect to the adopted child.  
An agreement providing for visitation by a third party would impair the 
adoptive parents’ rights.  Such an agreement might also impair the new parent-
child relationship with very undesirable consequences. We find that such an 
agreement is unenforceable. 
Hill v. Moorman, 525 So. 2d 681, 681–82 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (citations omitted). 
 7. For an excellent summary of the development of American adoption law and 
its recent changes, see Annette Ruth Appell, Blending Families Through Adoption: 
Implications for Collaborative Adoption Law and Practice, 75 B.U. L. REV. 997, 1003–
13 (1995). 
 8. Open adoption is defined as: 
[A] process in which the birthparents and the adoptive parents meet and 
exchange identifying information.  The birthparents relinquish legal and basic 
childrearing rights to the adoptive parents.  Both sets of parents retain the right 
to continuing contact and access to knowledge on behalf of the child.  Within 
this definition, there is room for greater and lesser degrees of contact between 
the parties. 




of and access to adopting parents through the growth of independent9 
and open adoptions,10 they have also become more vulnerable to 
deception by those eager to facilitate adoptions.11  Because birth parents 
are more able to negotiate for ongoing contact, adopting parents sometimes 
feel pressured to promise a level of openness or contact that they do not 
really desire or intend in order to get a birth parent to place a child with 
them.12  However, if they make such a promise and renege on it once the 
adoption is final, the birth parent may not have legal recourse because 
postadoption contact agreements are unenforceable in many states.13  
Annette Baran & Reuben Pannor, Open Adoption, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOPTION 
316, 318 (David M. Brodzinsky & Marshall D. Schechter eds., 1990).  As the Supreme 
Court of Connecticut noted, the term “open adoption” is something of a misnomer. 
“[O]pen adoption” . . . conveys a misleading impression of what such agreements 
intend to accomplish.  The plaintiff does not seek to “open,” to set aside or to 
diminish in any way the adoptive process that has substituted the defendants as 
the legal parents of the child.  The plaintiff’s rights are not premised on an ongoing 
genetic relationship that somehow survives a termination of parental rights and 
adoption.  Instead, the plaintiff is asking us to decide whether, as an adult who 
has had an ongoing personal relationship with the child, she may contract with 
the adopting parents, prior to adoption, for the continued right to visit with the 
child, so long as that visitation continues to be in the best interest of the child. 
Michaud v. Wawruck, 551 A.2d 738, 740–41 (Conn. 1988). 
 9. The term “independent adoption” refers to adoptions arranged privately 
between the adopting parents and the birth parents without the assistance of an adoption 
agency.  Actual statistics on the number and types of adoptions have been difficult to 
collect because there is no comprehensive national data collection system, particularly 
for private agency and independent adoptions, and because of the privacy protections in 
place for adoption.  However, one study shows that the percentage of independently 
arranged adoptions declined steadily after adoptions became more formalized in the 
middle of the twentieth century, reached a low of 21% in 1971, and then increased to 
31% in 1986.  Kathy S. Stolley, Statistics on Adoption in the United States, THE FUTURE 
OF CHILDREN, Spring 1993, at 26, 30. 
 10. Specific statistics on this are unavailable for the reasons given in note 9.  
However, the growing number of state legislatures and courts that have addressed the 
issue suggests that the practice is common, see infra note 13, and most commentators 
agree, see, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Adoption in the Age of Reproductive Technology, 
2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 393, 445 (2004). 
 11. See Baran & Pannor, supra note 8, at 330. 
 12. Janet Hopkins Dickson, Comment, The Emerging Rights of Adoptive Parents: 
Substance or Specter?, 38 UCLA L. REV. 917, 917–22 (1991) (arguing that, due to the 
shortage of adoptable infants, adoption is now a “provider’s market” and birth parents 
can “dictate whimsical requirements for the adoptive home”).  For an example of 
adoptive parents reconsidering the terms of a postadoption visitation agreement after the 
adoption became final, see Groves v. Clark, 982 P.2d 446, 447–48 (Mont. 1999). 
 13. Three states have specific statutory provisions prohibiting enforcement of 
postadoption contact agreements.  N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:14 (West, Westlaw 
through 2007 Reg. Sess.); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3107.62, 3107.63, 3107.65 (West, 
Westlaw through 2007 legislation); TENN CODE ANN. § 36-1-121 (West, Westlaw 
through 2007 First Reg. Sess.).  Another seven states have case law indicating that 
postadoption contact agreements are not enforceable.  See In re Adoption of Hammer, 
487 P.2d 417, 420 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971); People ex rel. MM, 726 P.2d 1108, 1124–25 
(Colo. 1986); In re MM, 619 N.E.2d 702, 708 (Ill. 1993); Birth Mother v. Adoptive 
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This adds to the emotional pain of an already traumatic experience for 
birth parents,14 and it cheats other adopting parents, such as the actual 
minister and doctor in the sitcom example above, of the opportunity to 
parent that child. 
At first blush it may seem that this problem could be avoided because, 
as voluntarily entered agreements with consideration—the placement of 
the baby with a particular family in exchange for a promise of continuing 
contact by the adoptive parent—such arrangements would be enforceable 
under normal contract law.15  However, adoption is a creature of state 
statutory law,16 and for both this reason and important public policy 
reasons,17 adoption is not governed by general common law contract 
Parents, 59 P.3d 1233, 1235–36 (Nev. 2002); In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 736 A.2d 
1246, 1259 (N.J. 1999); Lowe v. Clayton, 212 S.E.2d 582, 587 (S.C. 1975); Stickles v. 
Reichardt, 234 N.W. 728, 730 (Wis. 1931).  Seven states have statutory provisions 
allowing some limited enforcement, but excluding many agreements involving adoptions 
of infants voluntarily relinquished at birth.  CAL. FAM. CODE § 8616.5 (West, Westlaw 
through 2007 Reg. Sess.); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.0427 (West, Westlaw through 2007 First 
Reg. Sess.); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-19-16-1 to 31-19-16-9 (West, Westlaw through 2007 
Pub. Laws); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1269.1 (West, Westlaw through 2006 Sess. 
Acts); MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-5-301 (West, Westlaw through 2005 Reg. Sess.); OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7003-5.6f (West, Westlaw through 2007 First Reg. Sess.); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 15-7-14.1 (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation).  Only ten states have 
statutory provisions providing for the enforcement of all voluntary postadoption 
contact agreements, subject to a “best interests of the child” standard.  ALASKA 
STAT. § 25.23.180(j), (l) (2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17a-112, 45a-715 (West, 
Westlaw through Jan. 2007 Reg. Sess.); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 5-308, 5-3A-08, 
5-3B-07 (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210 § 6C 
(West, Westlaw through 2007 Sess.); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.58 (West, Westlaw 
through 2007 Reg. Sess.); N.M. STAT. ANN. §32A-5-35 (West, Westlaw through June 
2007 Reg. Sess.); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 112-b (West, Westlaw through 2007 legislation); 
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.305 (West, Westlaw through 2005 Reg. Sess.); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 25-6-17 (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 26.33.295 (West, Westlaw through 2007 legislation).  The remaining states lack 
explicit statutory provisions or clear case law on the subject. 
 14. Anne B. Brodzinsky, Surrendering an Infant for Adoption: The Birthmother 
Experience, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOPTION, supra note 8, at 295, 304 (“[F]or many 
women, the experience of surrendering an infant for adoption is a nearly intolerable 
loss.”). 
 15. For a contract to be valid in California, it must have (1) parties capable of 
contracting; (2) consent; (3) a lawful object; and (4) consideration.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 1550 
(West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.).  For a definition of consideration, see 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981). 
 16. In re Baby Boy M., 272 Cal. Rptr. 27, 29 (Ct. App. 1990) (“The law of adoptions is 
purely statutory.” (citing In re Adoption of McDonald, 274 P.2d 860 (1954))). 
 17. In re Jaren's Adoption, 27 N.W.2d 656, 660 (Minn. 1947) (“[T]he public, as 
well as those immediately concerned, have vital interests in matters of this nature, since, 
obviously, it is a matter of immediate concern to all members of the state.”). 




principles.18  Thus the enforceability of postadoption contact agreements 
varies widely from state to state.19  This body of state law is evolving 
every year as legislatures and courts continue to struggle with competing 
policy considerations regarding how much openness to permit and 
protect in adoption.20
California’s statute on postadoption contact agreements21 provides an 
excellent illustration of this evolution.  California began regulating agreements 
for postadoption contact by allowing “kinship adoption agreements” in 
1997.22  Kinship adoption agreements were intended to encourage adoptions 
of youth in the dependency system by family members.23  The law was 
changed in 2000 to allow “postadoption contact agreements” in all adoptions 
where they are voluntarily entered into by all parties and are in the best 
interests of the child.24  These agreements are currently enforceable 
under California Family Code section 8616.5, but they are limited to 
sharing information about the child and cannot include visitation if the 
birth relative and the child did not have an existing relationship before 
the adoption.25  Moreover, although in adoptions out of the dependency 
system the social worker is to inform the birth parents of the opportunity 
to form postadoption contact agreements,26 in all other adoptions there is 
 18. See, e.g., Birth Mother v. Adoptive Parents, 59 P.3d 1233, 1235 (Nev. 2002) 
(“[W]ithout such a specific Nevada statutory provision [allowing agreements for 
postadoption contact], the agreement between the birth mother and the adoptive parents 
is unenforceable.”). 
 19. See supra note 13.  This inconsistency makes negotiating postadoption contact 
especially difficult in interstate adoptions because the parties must determine which 
state’s laws will control and how that state views these agreements. 
 20. For example, Maryland has recently enacted a bill that provides broad 
enforcement of postadoption contact agreements.  MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 5-308, 
5-3A-08, 5-3B-07 (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.).  This is not necessarily a 
departure from prior practice.  Maryland courts have recognized that these agreements 
could be enforced in equity since the 1980s, but it does signal new recognition of the 
value of these agreements.  See Weinschel v. Strople, 466 A.2d 1301 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 1983). 
 21. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8616.5 (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.). 
 22. Id. § 8714.7. 
 23. 1997 Cal. Stat. ch. 793.  Kinship adoption agreements preceded and are different 
from “Kin-GAP” guardianships.  Kin-GAP guardianships provide another arrangement, 
short of adoption, to make it easier for family members to provide care for children who 
would otherwise be in the foster care system.  See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 11360–
11375 (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.). 
 24. 2000 Cal. Stat. ch. 910. 
 25. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8616.5(b)(3) (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.). 
 26. Id. § 8715(b).  The corresponding regulations clarify that the agency must 
inform both the adoptive and birth parents of the availability of postadoption contact 
agreements.  CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 35179.1 (2005).  Notably, these regulations have 
not been updated to reflect the new terminology or expanded scope of these agreements, 
but rather refer to them as kinship adoption agreements which apply only to relatives.  
Id. 
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no affirmative duty on California courts or adoption facilitators to inform 
birth parents of this option.27
This Comment argues that California should continue the evolution of 
its statutory scheme by: (1) allowing and enforcing visitation terms in all 
adoption agreements that meet the statutory requirements of voluntariness 
and the best interests of the child,28 and (2) requiring that the consent 
process inform all birth parents of the possibility of these agreements.  
Part II explores the history and current status of California’s treatment of 
postadoption contact agreements, including the protections provided for 
adoptive parents and adopted children.  Part III demonstrates that the 
current limitation on visitation is arbitrary and unnecessary and that 
important policy considerations support removing it.  Part III also analyzes 
the arguments against expanding the law to allow visitation and concludes 
that these concerns are outweighed by the policies favoring expansions.  
Part IV focuses on the need to inform all birth parents of their options in 
this regard.  Finally, Part V provides specific recommendations for amending 
the California postadoption contact agreement statute to better serve the 
interests of all parties and the State’s public policy goals.  Though this 
Comment focuses on California law, the ideas explored here are applicable 
to all states.29
II.  HISTORY AND CURRENT STATUS OF CALIFORNIA LAW 
Prior to 1997, California had no statutory provision directly related to 
postadoption contact agreements, and the State’s case law had not 
clearly addressed the enforceability of such agreements.  Two California 
Court of Appeals cases decided in 1984 and 1985 held that courts could 
not award visitation to a birth relative after the child had been adopted, 
but neither involved a prior voluntary agreement between the adoptive 
 27. The legislature has not yet required notice of this option in other adoptions, 
and in the absence of a statutory requirement, it does not rise to the level of a due process 
right.  See In re Kimberly S., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 740 (Ct. App. 1999); In re Zachary D., 83 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 407 (Ct. App. 1999). 
 28. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8616.5(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.). 
 29. This discussion is particularly relevant to Indiana, Louisiana, and Rhode 
Island, which have all limited enforcement of postadoption visitation agreements to 
situations where the adopted child has some sort of relationship with the birth parent.  
IND. CODE ANN. § 31-19-16-2 (West, Westlaw through 2007 Pub. Laws); LA. CHILD. 
CODE ANN. art. 1269.1 (West, Westlaw through 2006 Sess. Acts); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-
7-14.1 (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation). 




parent and the birth relatives in question.30  Several other cases acknowledged 
the existence of open adoptions, but none specifically ruled on the 
enforceability of agreements for ongoing contact.31
Thus, the legislature was dealing with a clean slate when it made its 
first foray into this area with the passage of California Family Code 
section 8714.7 in 1997.32  This statute allowed formal, enforceable agreements 
for ongoing contact in cases where children were being adopted by a 
relative, and was intended to promote adoption out of the foster care 
system.33  The legislature made this intention explicit in section 8714.5 
of the Family Code: 
It is the intent of the Legislature to expedite legal permanency for children who 
cannot return to their parents and to remove barriers to adoption by relatives of 
children who are already in the dependency system or who are at risk of 
entering the dependency system. 
This goal will be achieved by empowering families, including extended families, to 
care for their own children safely and permanently whenever possible, by 
preserving existing family relationships, thereby causing the least amount of 
disruption to the child and the family . . . .34
The 1997 law was both popular and successful.  The California 
Adoption Initiative Update issued by the Department of Social Services 
credited section 8714.7 as one of the reforms that allowed them to increase 
the number of public agency adoptions in California by 88% over three 
years, and to increase the proportion of children adopted from long term 
foster care by 42%.35
Inspired by the success of kinship adoption agreements, the legislature 
amended the law in 2000, changing the name of the agreements to 
“postadoption contact agreements” and expanding their applicability to 
all adoptions, regardless of whether the child was related to the adopting 
parent.36  This version of the statute allows for enforcement of agreements 
for visitation between the child and various birth relatives with whom he 
 30. Huffman v. Grob, 218 Cal. Rptr. 659 (Ct. App. 1985); Marckwardt v. Superior 
Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 41 (Ct. App. 1984). 
 31. See In re Sylvia R., 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 93, 95 (Ct. App. 1997); In re Teneka W., 
43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 666, 668 (Ct. App. 1995); In re Alma B., 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 592, 595 (Ct. 
App. 1994); In re Baby Boy M., 272 Cal. Rptr. 27, 33 (Ct. App. 1990); In re Angela R., 
260 Cal. Rptr. 612 (Ct. App. 1989). 
 32. 1997 Cal. Stat. ch. 793. 
 33. Id. 
 34. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8714.5(a)(1), (a)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. 
Sess.) (section numbers omitted). 
 35. Dependent Children: Postadoption Contact Agreements: Hearing on S.B. 2157 
Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 1999–2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. 1–2 (Cal. 2000), available at 
CA B. An., S.B. 2157 Sen., 3/28/2000 (Westlaw) (bill analysis commenting on purpose 
of legislation). 
 36. 2000 Cal. Stat. ch. 910. 
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or she had an existing relationship.37  Birth relatives who did not have an 
existing relationship with the child can have postadoption contact agreements, 
but these must be limited to the sharing of information about the child.38
The 1997 and 2000 versions of the statute resided in Chapter 2 of the 
Adoption Division of the Family Code, which pertains to agency adoptions, 
specifically those out of the dependency system.39  To make clear that 
the postadoption contact agreement section applies to all adoptions, 
not just those out of dependency, in 2003 the legislature renumbered it 
to place it in the general provisions of Chapter 1, giving it its current 
section number of 8616.5.40  In 2004, the legislature made an additional 
amendment to allow Indian Tribes to be parties to postadoption contact 
agreements where the child being adopted is American Indian.41  Thus, 
the current law provides the option of postadoption contact agreements for 
birth relatives and Indian Tribes in all adoptions, but limits the agreements 
to exchange of information about the child in situations where there is no 
existing relationship between the child and the birth relative.  The Family 
Code does not define “existing relationship,” 42 but it seems clear that this 
provision intends to prohibit visitation by birth parents who surrender 
their children at birth.43
 37. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8714.7(b)(1)(A) (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.). 
 38. Id. § 8714.7(b)(2). 
 39. There is some indication that the legislature initially only intended the statute 
to apply to adoptions from the dependency system, and felt it was unnecessary for 
private adoptions.  Dependent Children: Postadoption Contact Agreements: Hearing on 
S.B. 2157 Before the Assemb. Comm. on Human Servs., 1999–2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. 3 
(Cal. 2000), available at CA B. An., S.B. 2157 Assem., 6/21/2000 (Westlaw) (“Postadoptive 
contact agreements are routinely utilized in the private adoption system.  This bill 
authorizes the use of open adoption agreements for the adoption of youth in the juvenile 
dependency system in the same manner they are used in the private adoption system.”). 
 40. 2003 Cal. Stat. ch. 251. 
 41. 2004 Cal. Stat. ch. 858.  Additional minor amendments to clarify these 
provisions relating to Indian Tribes recently became law.  2006 Cal. Stat. ch. 838, § 9. 
 42. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 8500–8548 (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.). 
 43. Other states with similar statutory limitations on postadoption contact use 
slightly clearer language.  IND. CODE ANN. § 31-19-16-2 (West, Westlaw through 2007 
Pub. Laws) (allowing postadoption contact privileges where “the child is at least two (2) 
years of age and the court finds that there is a significant emotional attachment between 
the child and the birth parent”); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1269.1 (West, Westlaw 
through 2006 Sess. Acts) (enforcing agreements where “[t]he child has an established, 
significant relationship with that person to the extent that its loss would cause substantial 
harm to the child”); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-14.1 (West, Westlaw through 2006 
legislation) (requiring a finding by the court that there is a “significant emotional 
attachment between the child and the birth parent”). 




The restriction on visitation is not the only limitation on postadoption 
contact agreements.  The statute has always provided significant protections 
for adoptive parents and adopted children who are parties to these 
agreements.  Most importantly, the agreement must be voluntary, in 
writing, and in the best interests of the child.44  This means that     
(1) adopting parents cannot be forced by the courts to allow visitation 
to which they have not willingly consented;45 (2) birth relatives cannot 
make spurious claims of agreement where none exists in writing; and 
(3) the court must scrutinize any agreement before it to ensure it will not 
be harmful to the child involved.  The child is considered a party to the 
agreement and, if twelve or older, is required to give written consent.46  
This gives the child some protection against being forced to continue a 
relationship with a birth relative with whom he or she does not wish to 
retain contact.47  The adoption cannot be set aside for failure to comply 
with the agreement,48 nor can monetary damages be granted for breach.49  
Thus, the worst result facing a party who breaches the agreement is an 
order enforcing visitation, and even this can be avoided if the breaching 
 44. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8616.5(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.). 
 45. Though the courts have not yet considered the constitutional implications of 
this aspect of voluntariness, it should prevent the statute from running afoul of 
Fourteenth Amendment protection of a parent’s right to “make decisions concerning the 
care, custody, and control of their children.”  Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000).  
The Troxel Court held that in the absence of a finding of parental unfitness, court-ordered 
visitation for birth grandparents is unconstitutional.  Id. at 70.  The visitation in that case is 
distinguishable from postadoption contact agreements because it was not voluntarily 
consented to by the parent.  For a fuller discussion of Troxel and parental autonomy, see 
infra text accompanying notes 156–161. 
 46. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8616.5(d) (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.).  
Though it is progressive of California to make the child a party to the contract, the 
choice of age twelve seems arbitrary.  Is a ten-year-old any less interested in this decision 
or less able to understand the situation?  Though it may be arbitrary, California’s position is 
consistent with other states that make the child a party to these contracts, such as Indiana 
and Rhode Island, which both also use age twelve.  IND. CODE ANN. § 31-19-16-2(6) 
(West, Westlaw through 2006 Pub. Laws); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-14.1(b)(5) (West, 
Westlaw through 2006 legislation). 
 47. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8616.5(d) (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.).  This 
section does provide an exception to the requirement that a child give consent if the court 
finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agreement is in the best interests of 
the child.  It seems unlikely, however, that the court would make such a finding if the 
child were strongly opposed to the contact. 
 48. Id. § 8616.5(e)(1), (k). 
 49. Id. § 8616.5(g).  Subsection (g) references subsection (e) which provides 
warnings that must be included in the postadoption contact agreement.  Id.  The contents 
of these warnings are not otherwise set out in the statute, but, based on both the 
importance of their contents and the cross-references to them, they seem to be intended 
as independent provisions as well as warnings. 
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party can demonstrate that enforcement would not be in the best interests 
of the child.50
The legislature also limited the potential financial burden of enforcement 
actions.  Petitioners must at least attempt to mediate the dispute in good 
faith prior to bringing a court action,51 and the costs for mediation or 
dispute resolution are borne by each party, excluding the child.52  Thus, 
even if the birth relative accuses the adoptive parents of breaching the 
agreement, a costly trial can be avoided by resolving the matter in mediation.  
In the event that mediation fails and the dispute does end up in court, 
costs can be minimized because neither testimony nor an evidentiary 
hearing is required.53  The person bringing the action must bear the costs 
of litigation unless it is found that a party, other than the child, breached 
the agreement without good cause.54
There have been no published cases interpreting the current version of 
section 8616.5.  Two notable cases did weigh in on the original kinship 
adoption agreement statute,55 however, and seem to apply to postadoption 
contact agreements.  These cases, In re Kimberly S.56 and In re Zachary 
D.,57 both held that birth parents losing their parental rights did not have 
to be told that kinship adoption agreements could provide them an 
option for ongoing contact with their children.  The Third District Court 
of Appeals acknowledged that, at least in some cases, notification would 
be desirable, but found that the legislature had not required it.58  The 
Fifth District Court of Appeals noted that birth parents had no due 
process right to notification.59
 50. Id. § 8616.5(h).  Although this Comment began by suggesting that the adoptive 
parents may be the ones tempted to breach the agreement, the statutory language suggests that 
the agreement is enforceable against all parties, including the birth relatives, if it is in the 
best interests of the child. 
 51. Id. § 8616.5(f). 
 52. Id. § 8616.5(i). 
 53. Id. § 8616.5 (f), (h)(2)(C).  Protection from unexpected costs is a vital part of 
this statute.  Adopting parents might otherwise be deterred from entering into a 
postadoption contact agreement for fear of having the expense of litigating it if 
something goes wrong, and birth parents often have fewer financial resources, and may 
not be able to afford an expensive trial to enforce their rights under an agreement. 
 54. Id. § 8616.5(i). 
 55. Id. § 8714.7. 
 56. 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 740 (Ct. App. 1999). 
 57. 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 407 (Ct. App. 1999). 
 58. Id. at 408, 410. 
 59. In re Kimberly S., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 747.  It should be noted that both 
Kimberly S. and Zachary D. were dependency cases, where the birth parents’ parental 




Following Kimberly S. and Zachary D., the state legislature passed the 
2000 amendments to what is now the postadoption contact agreement 
statute.  One of the amendments requires that the social study conducted 
for the court in dependency cases address whether or not the social 
worker discussed a postadoption contact agreement with the child’s birth 
parents.60  However, this language applies only to adoptions out of the 
dependency system, and it does not reach birth parents who are voluntarily 
relinquishing children in independent or private agency adoptions.61
III.  THE CASE FOR EXPANDING THE AVAILABILITY OF                     
VISITATION TO ALL ADOPTIONS 
Several important public policy considerations favor expanding the 
visitation provisions of California Family Code section 8616.5.  These 
include the best interests of the child, the well-being of the birth parent, 
fairness considerations, and the encouragement of adoption. 
A.  Best Interests of the Child 
Under the statute, the best interests of the child standard can be used 
to protect against unhealthy postadoption contact.62  However, in many 
cases, the best interests of the child will be served by an ongoing relationship 
with a birth relative.  By knowing the birth relative, the adoptee will be 
better able to navigate through the unique identity issues adoptees face 
and will have easy access to medical and family background information. 
rights were terminated by the court.  In California, attorneys are generally appointed for 
parents in these cases, so arguably the birth parents should have been informed of the 
availability of kinship adoption agreements by their counsel.  See CAL. WELF. & INST. 
CODE § 366.26 (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.).  But see In re Kimberly S., 83 
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 747 (holding that counsel’s failure to advise about availability of kinship 
adoption agreements did not require reversal of order terminating parental rights). 
 60. 2000 Cal. Stat. ch. 930 (“This bill would require the social study to also 
contain a specified discussion regarding the parent’s option to enter into a postadoption 
contact agreement, thereby imposing new duties on local personnel and creating a state-
mandated local program.”); see also Dependent Children: Postadoption Contact Agreements: 
Hearing on S.B. 2157 Before the S. Rules Comm., 1999–2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. 5 (Cal. 
2000), available at CA B. An., S.B. 2157 Sen., 7/03/2000 (Westlaw) (“This would ensure 
that birth parents are aware of this option, and thus perhaps alleviate their concerns and 
resistance to placing their child for adoption.”).  Although it is not explicitly stated in the 
legislative history, the timing indicates that the amendment may be a reaction to the 
courts’ holdings in Kimberly S. and Zachary D. 
 61. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8715(b) (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.).  The 
need to expand this provision to reach these other types of adoptions is discussed further 
in Part IV of this Comment.  See infra Part IV. 
 62. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 8616.5(f) (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. 
Sess.) (“The court may not order compliance with the agreement absent a finding that . . . 
the enforcement is in the best interests of the child.”). 
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Psychologists have identified several identity issues unique to adoptees63 
which can lead to shame, embarrassment, and lowered self esteem.64  
Two of these identity issues can be alleviated, at least partially, by allowing 
the child to build a relationship with a birth relative.  The first is prolongation 
of family romance fantasy, a typically brief period in normal development 
when children doubt they are their parents’ children and imagine other, 
better parents.65  It develops as a way of coping with disappointment and 
ambivalence toward parents.66  For adoptees, this fantasy has a dimension 
of reality because there are other parents.  In closed adoptions, the child can 
become fixated on imagining the unknown parents, impeding their 
overall identification process.67  If the child is allowed visitation with the 
birth parent, however, then they cannot create a new image from whole 
cloth.  Though the child may still fantasize about life with the birth parents, 
these fantasies will be more grounded in reality, and the adoptive parents 
are likely to compare more favorably than they would to a fiction. 
The second identity issue that visitation can address is “genealogical 
bewilderment.”68  This term was coined by H. J. Sants in 1964,69 and 
many psychologists have since built upon it.70  Though descriptions vary 
somewhat, this bewilderment can be summed up as confusion and 
uncertainty resulting from lack of knowledge of the adoptee’s background, 
inability to identify with the adoptive parents because of hereditary 
differences in appearance or intelligence,71 and impaired identity 
formation “because an essential part of himself or herself has been cut 
off and remains unknown.”72  This concept is not unique to psychological 
literature; it is also a theme of the open adoption records movement, or 
 63. Although there is no consensus that identity problems are more severe for 
adoptees than for other children, resolving identity issues is more complex for adopted 
adolescents.  Janet L. Hoopes, Adoption and Identity Formation, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
ADOPTION, supra note 8, at 144, 149. 
 64. Baran & Pannor, supra note 8, at 318. 
 65. Hoopes, supra note 63, at 152. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. H. J. Sants, Genealogical Bewilderment in Children with Substitute Parents, 
37 BRIT. J. MED. PSYCHOL. 133, 133 (1964). 
 70. See Hoopes, supra note 63, at 152–53. 
 71. Sants, supra note 69, at 136, 138.  Sants described this as a lack of “biological 
link.”  Id. at 138. 
 72. Hoopes, supra note 63, at 152. 




“search movement.”73  Betty Jean Lifton, an adoptee and prominent 
search activist, calls it “cosmic loneliness” and explains: 
Without concrete information about the circumstances of your birth, especially 
about the woman who gave you life, the adoptee often has the sense of not 
having been born at all. . . .  The adoptee feels alone in the world.  Connected to 
his adoptive home by the fragmentary adoption narrative and disconnected from 
his real biological narrative, he has lost his place on the intergenerational chain 
of being.74
Some argue that the need to know one’s origins is not as universal as 
these psychologists and search activists would have us believe, but this 
does not diminish the fact that it is a very real need for many adoptees.75
Birth relative visitation clearly and directly addresses the genealogical 
bewilderment problem.  Instead of being “cut off” from their origins,76 
children who visit with their birth relatives can receive direct answers to 
their questions and learn their full biological “narratives.”77  Additionally, 
visitation can help relieve the sense of rejection that is often conveyed 
by a birth parent’s absence.78
In additional to these psychological benefits, a personal relationship 
with the birth relative supports physical health by providing ready access 
to medical information.  Although many states require that background 
medical information be provided at the time of adoption,79 this information 
may be incomplete because many hereditary diseases develop later in 
adulthood and may not have shown up by the time of the adoption.80
 73. See KATARINA WEGAR, ADOPTION, IDENTITY AND KINSHIP 8–10 (1997).  The 
“search movement” was a social movement, primarily made up of adoptees, but also 
some birth parents, seeking more openness in adoption records.  For an excellent history 
of this movement, see Elizabeth J. Samuels, The Idea of Adoption: An Inquiry into the 
History of Adult Adoptee Access to Birth Records, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 367 (2001). 
 74. BETTY JEAN LIFTON, JOURNEY OF THE ADOPTED SELF: A QUEST FOR WHOLENESS 
46–47 (1994). 
 75. Katarina Wegar states: 
Arguments based on the real desire of adoptees to know or meet their 
biological relatives need not be based on essentialist or universalist assumption 
of innate sources.  Considering the weight attributed to the biological 
underpinnings of parent-child relationships in this society, it is both cruel and 
unreasonable to expect adoptees and their biological parents to feel otherwise. 
WEGAR, supra note 73, at 136–37. 
 76. Hoopes, supra note 63, at 152. 
 77. LIFTON, supra note 74, at 47. 
 78. Elizabeth J. Samuels, Time to Decide? The Laws Governing Mothers’ 
Consents to the Adoption of Their Newborn Infants, 72 TENN. L. REV. 509, 531 (2005). 
 79. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 8706 (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.). 
 80. Many of the leading causes of death are hereditary and do not take strike until 
middle age or the senior years.  The University Hospital, Adult Onset Disease Program 
Introduction, http://www.theuniversityhospital.com/adultgenetics/intro.htm (last visited 
July 2, 2007). 
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In summary, allowing the maximum amount of contact agreeable to 
the parties supports a child’s best interests by promoting his or her mental, 
emotional, and physical well-being. 
B. Well-being of the Birth Parent 
The child is not the only party whose best interests may be served by 
postadoption visitation.81  Birth parents may also benefit from knowing 
their child and seeing them happy and successful in the adoptive 
environment.82  The old view, that closed adoption helps birth parents 
put an unfortunate experience behind them and get on with their lives, 
has proved to be fiction.83  Social workers and psychologists now recognize 
that “[g]iving birth to a child and being that child’s birth mother is a fact 
of life that cannot be wiped out.”84
It is not simply that the birth experience cannot be wiped out; it 
produces an intense and ongoing sense of loss which has long-term 
consequences for the life of the birth mother.85  For example, one study 
found that 71% of birth mothers believed that their experience had 
negatively impacted their subsequent marital relationships.86  Although 
most formal studies have focused on birth mothers, there is clinical 
evidence that birth fathers also experience this sense of loss, which 
results in feelings of grief and anger.87  This feeling of loss stems, at 
least in part, from the absence of the child from the birth parent’s life. 
The birth parent experiences grief similar to that encountered by 
someone facing the death of a loved one.88  This problem may be 
 81. Though this section focuses on the well-being of the birth parents, an open 
relationship can benefit the adoptive parents as well.  At a minimum, the adoptive 
parents can benefit from the increased well-being of their child and access to their 
medical history.  See supra text accompanying notes 62–80.  They can also benefit by 
developing a relationship with someone with whom they share a unique bond: their love 
of the child. 
 82. Baran & Pannor, supra note 8, at 329 (“Birthmothers, who are comfortable 
with their decision and able to know how that child is progressing, are better able to 
move forward.”). 
 83. VIVIAN B. SHAPIRO ET AL., COMPLEX ADOPTION AND ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGY 148 (2001); see also Brodzinsky, supra note 14, at 295–300 (discussing 
historical perspectives on the birthmother experience and their development). 
 84. Baran & Pannor, supra note 8, at 329. 
 85. See Brodzinsky, supra note 14, at 300–03. 
 86. Id. at 301. 
 87. SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 83, at 155. 
 88. Brodzinsky, supra note 14, at 310–14 (suggesting a bereavement model based 
on mourning norms after a death to help birth parents deal with their loss). 




compounded in the adoption context because if the child was 
relinquished at birth, birth parents may be unable to avail themselves of 
some of the most important salves of the grieving process, including 
reminiscing about the lost love one, sharing stories, and receiving sympathy 
from others who share the loss.89  Visitation can provide these tools of 
mourning back to the birth parent by giving them stories to tell about the 
child and a connection with others who care about the child. 
While openness in adoptions, including visitation, will help some birth 
parents cope with the loss of a child, it will not help all of them.  Some 
find the closure of a closed adoption helpful in the immediate moment of 
loss.90  But for some birth parents openness provides important benefits.  
As one text put it: 
Open adoption enables some birth parents to internalize a less negative sense of 
themselves because they have chosen the adoptive parents whom they feel will 
value and treasure their child.  The separation from the baby can be less 
traumatic, relieving guilt and allowing the birth mother to move on more easily 
with her own development.91
It is true that visitation is not strictly necessary for the birth parent to 
benefit from openness.  Different degrees of contact will work better for 
different sets of birth parents and adoptive parents.92  Still, knowing that 
visitation may mitigate the negative impact of adoption for some birth 
parents, we should allow them the flexibility to negotiate for the degree 
of contact that they feel is appropriate. 
C. Fairness 
Principles of fairness also support a broader scope of visitation in 
postadoption contact agreements for two reasons.  First, California’s own 
forms are unfairly misleading under the current law.  Second, because 
visitation agreements are created irrespective of the current statute, their 
unenforceability can create situations of deceit and unfair gain. 
The fact that California Family Code section 8616.5 does not provide 
for visitation in situations where the birth relative does not have an 
existing relationship with the child does not prevent people from bargaining 
for and agreeing to visitation in placements at birth.  Outside of the 
 89. Id. at 312. 
 90. SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 83, at 156 (“For some, closure is helpful in the 
immediate crisis.  This defense may continue for many years; even at a point later in life, 
some birth parents cannot express feelings about the adoption and do not wish to deal 
with the subject.”).  The authors note, however, that this response to the loss may “come 
at a great emotional cost to future recovery.”  Id. 
 91. Id. (citation omitted). 
 92. See id. at 169. 
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statute, there is no clear indication in the public materials published 
by the State that there is any limitation on the types of contact to which 
the parties can agree. 
For example, the California Courts website provides self-help access 
to a variety of forms to help adopting parents.93  Included on this site is a 
standard form for postadoption contact agreements.94  This form lists 
visitation as one of several options that the involved parties choose from 
in structuring their ongoing contact, making no mention of the statutory 
prohibition for birth parents who did not have an existing relationship 
with the child.95  In fact, the form does not refer to the current statute at 
all, though it does reference the old kinship adoption statute which was 
even more limiting.96  The self-service web page also contains forms for: 
requesting enforcement of a postadoption contact agreement;97 answering 
an enforcement request;98 and for the judicial order to enforce, end, or 
change a contact agreement.99  All of these forms mention other 
requirements of the statute, such as the requirement to attempt mediation 
before requesting judicial enforcement,100 but they make no mention of 
any limitation on enforcement of visitation based on prior relationship 
with the child.  A party to a postadoption contract made using these 
forms would have no idea that it would not be enforceable under the law. 
Refusing to enforce an otherwise valid voluntary agreement made in 
apparent compliance with the State’s own forms appears unfair.  Courts 
may disagree because the form does reference a statute and because 
 93. California Courts Self-Help Center, Adoption Forms, http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/ 
selfhelp/family/adoption/adoptforms.htm (last visited July 2, 2007). 
 94. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., CONTACT AFTER ADOPTION AGREEMENT (rev. 
2003), http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/forms/fillable/adopt310.pdf. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., REQUEST TO: ENFORCE, CHANGE, END CONTACT 
AFTER ADOPTION AGREEMENT (rev. 2003), http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/forms/fillable/ 
adopt315.pdf. 
 98. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., ANSWER TO REQUEST TO: ENFORCE, CHANGE, END 
CONTACT AFTER ADOPTION AGREEMENT (rev. 2003), http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/forms/fillable/ 
adopt320.pdf. 
 99. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., JUDGE’S ORDER TO: ENFORCE, CHANGE, END 
CONTACT AFTER ADOPTION AGREEMENT (rev. 2003), http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/forms/fillable/ 
adopt325.pdf. 
 100. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8616.5(h)(2)(C) (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.). 




citizens are presumed to know the law.101  Most would agree, however, 
that people should not be entitled to gain from promises they do not 
intend to keep.102  It follows, then, that birth parents who select specific 
adoptive parents for placement of their child in reliance on a promise of 
visitation should have recourse if that visitation is revoked without good 
cause.  Justice Rose said as much in her dissent when the Nevada 
Supreme Court refused to enforce such an agreement: 
    I . . . believe it is patently unfair to have a biological parent agree to the 
adoption of her or his child on the basis that continued contact will be 
permitted, but upon approval of the adoption, refuse to enforce the continued 
contact agreement.  A parent may specifically agree to an adoption of a child 
based on the ability to have periodic contact with the child.  The enforcement of 
the adoption agreement without also recognizing the contact provision leaves 
the biological parent with an adoption she or he never would have agreed to 
otherwise.  We should not permit birth parents to be so misled.103
Other courts have held that such a misleading promise amounts to 
coercion, and have invalidated adoptions on this basis.104  Though this 
response deals with the fairness issue, it seems to ignore the best interests 
of the child.  Surely the child’s interests are most often better served by 
enforcing the agreement and allowing the child to remain in the home he 
or she has become accustomed to, with the only parents he or she may 
have ever known, rather than by reversing the adoption.105  Fairness is 
important but should not overshadow the child’s interests. 
D.  Encouraging Adoption 
As mentioned in Part II of this Comment, the purpose of the original 
kinship adoption agreement statute was to encourage adoptions from the 
 101. Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 130 (1985) (“The claim that petitioners had a . . . right 
to better notice . . . is without merit.  All citizens are presumptively charged with knowledge 
of the law . . . .”). 
 102. This situation is generally considered at best deceit, and at worst fraud.  See, 
e.g., Graham v. L.A. First Nat. Trust & Sav. Bank, 43 P.2d 543, 545 (Cal. 1935) (“A 
promise made without any intention of performing it constitutes actual fraud and deceit.” 
(citing Boulevard Land Co. v. King, 13 P.2d 864 (Cal. Ct. App. 1932); Greenberg v. Du 
Bain Realty Corp., 42 P.2d 628 (Cal. 1935))). 
 103. Birth Mother v. Adoptive Parents, 59 P.3d 1233, 1237 (Nev. 2002) (Rose, J., 
dissenting). 
 104. Hill v. Moorman, 525 So. 2d 681 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (recognizing that such a 
challenge could be brought but dismissing the instant action as untimely); McCormick v. 
State, 354 N.W.2d 160 (Neb. 1984). 
 105. For a thorough discussion of the legal and psychological reasons that a child 
needs a stable environment, and the critical importance of continuity of care from his or 
her caregiver, see generally JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE 
CHILD: THE LEAST DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE (1996). 
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foster care system by family members.106  It succeeded, and the legislature 
cited this success in extending postadoption contact agreements to all 
adoptions.107  The bill analysis indicates that the legislature was still 
focused on facilitating adoptions out of foster care and hoped to reduce 
birth parents’ resistance to voluntarily relinquishing their rights.108  Though 
adoptions from voluntary relinquishments present a somewhat different 
set of concerns than foster care adoptions, the California Supreme Court 
has asserted that the State has a “clear interest in encouraging such 
adoptions [by voluntary relinquishment] and providing stable homes for 
children.”109  The court also noted that “[t]he state’s interest in this matter is 
particularly important in light of the large number of children born to 
unwed parents: some 25[%] of all children born in the United States 
between July 1989 and July 1990—approximately 913,000 out of 
3,900,000—were born out of wedlock.”110  The court does not explain why 
being born out of wedlock presents a special problem for the State, but it 
is presumably due to the economic realities of single motherhood.111
These realities are reflected in the most recent census reports.  As of 
2004, over 30% of people living in households headed by single mothers 
were living below the poverty line.112  In contrast, adoptive parents tend 
 106. 1997 Cal. Stat. ch. 793; CAL. FAM. CODE § 8714.5(a)(1), (a)(2) (West, Westlaw 
through 2007 Reg. Sess.). 
 107. Dependent Children: Postadoption Contact Agreements: Hearing on S.B. 2157 
Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 1999–2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. 2 (Cal. 2000), available at 
CA B. An., S.B. 2157 Sen., 3/28/2000 (Westlaw) (bill analysis commenting on purpose 
of legislation). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Adoption of Michael H., 898 P.2d 891, 898 (Cal. 1995). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Though children that might otherwise be placed for adoption sometimes live 
with their fathers, single-mother families are far more common, and therefore are the 
focus here.  See TERRY A. LUGAILA, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING 
ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH 1998 (UPDATE) (1998), http://www.census.gov/prod/99pubs/ 
p20-514.pdf. 
The majority of children who lived with a single parent in 1998 lived with their 
mother (84.1 percent).  About 40.3 percent of these children lived with 
mothers who had never been married.  Children who lived with their father 
only were more likely to be living with a divorced father (44.4 percent) than 
with a never-married father (33.3 percent). 
Id. 
 112. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HISTORICAL POVERTY TABLES, TABLE 2, POVERTY 
STATUS OF PEOPLE BY FAMILY RELATIONSHIP, RACE, AND HISPANIC ORIGIN: 1959 TO 
2005, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/histpov/hstpov2.html (last visited July 
2, 2007). 




to be financially well off.113  Thus, the State’s interest in encouraging 
adoption may be linked to a desire to minimize the number of children 
living in poverty.114  Some studies show that placing a child for adoption 
also has economic and educational benefits for the birth mother.115  
Whatever the reasons, to the extent that the State does hope to encourage 
adoptions from voluntarily relinquishment, it should extend the same 
opportunities for visitation that have been effective in encouraging 
adoptions from foster care.116
Though the preceding reasons clearly support an increase of the scope 
of birth relative visitation, it may also be helpful to explore reasons that 
have been given for limiting it.  These reasons vary but can be classified 
into three categories: (1) fear of a chilling effect on adoptions; (2) concern 
that adoptions would be disrupted or revoked; and (3) desire to protect 
the newly created family unit and with it the new parents’ autonomy. 
E. Chilling Effect 
Some argue that allowing visitation agreements in all adoptions would 
discourage potential parents who might otherwise adopt from pursuing 
domestic adoption.  In fact, it has been argued that recent increases in 
birth parent rights in the United States have led to the increase in 
international adoptions.117  Evidence supporting this theory is scant.  
Proponents tend to cite the increasing numbers of international adoptions 
and the declining number of domestic adoptions as indicative of this 
problem, but these correlations do not show that increasing openness and 
birth parent bargaining power is the cause.118  The true source of this 
trend is more likely a decline in the number of American women who 
are willing to carry babies to term and then relinquish them for adoption.119  
 113. See Stolley, supra note 9, at 38. 
 114. Poverty is not the only hazard the children of unwed mothers face.  For 
example, even accounting for factors like poverty and low parent education, adolescents 
raised without fathers are more likely to be incarcerated than their peers who have 
fathers in the home.  Cynthia C. Harper & Sara S. McLanahan, Father Absence and 
Youth Incarceration, 14 J. RES. ON ADOLESCENCE 369 (2004). 
 115. MADELYN FREUNDLICH, THE MARKET FORCES IN ADOPTION 67–68 (2000) 
(citing multiple studies). 
 116. Dependent Children: Postadoption Contact Agreements: Hearing on S.B. 2157 
Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 1999–2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. 2 (Cal. 2000), available at 
CA B. An., S.B. 2157 Sen., 3/28/2000 (Westlaw) (bill analysis commenting on purpose 
of legislation). 
 117. See, e.g., Alison Fleisher, Note, The Decline of Domestic Adoption: Intercountry 
Adoption as a Response to Local Adoption Laws and Proposals to Foster Domestic 
Adoption, 13 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 171 (2003). 
 118. Id. at 181–82. 
 119. Fleisher acknowledges as much: 
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The number of American families seeking to adopt domestically greatly 
exceeds the number of available infants in the United States.120  Thus, 
even if some potential adoptive parents were deterred from adopting 
domestically because of birth parents’ desire for visitation, it is unlikely 
that this would have any real impact on American infants’ prospects for 
adoption.121  Moreover, there is a critical shortage of adoptive parents for 
foster children, who are often older or have special needs.122  If families 
who are not interested in or cannot afford international adoption are 
deterred from adopting a domestic infant by the prospect of a postadoption 
contact agreement, perhaps they will consider adopting from this needier 
population.  Many of the children freed for adoption out of the foster 
care system achieve this status through the court’s termination of 
parental rights.  Since termination is involuntary, the birth parents have 
much less leverage to negotiate a postadoption contact agreement if the 
adopting parents do not want one. 
The number of American pregnancies is lower [now] than [it was] at any point 
in the last two decades. . . .  At the same time, innovations in and access to 
contraceptive technology, cultural values, and constitutional law have 
transformed the institution of adoption.  In addition, recent statistics show that 
22% of pregnancies are terminated by abortion.  Another factor is that infertility 
has significantly risen, partly due to a 50% decrease in sperm counts over the 
last century.  Furthermore, fewer children born to single parents are relinquished 
for adoption.  Hence, as contraception, abortion, infertility, and the tendency of 
single parents to keep their children have increased, there have been fewer 
domestic infants available for adoption. 
Id. at 174–75 (internal quotations and footnotes omitted). 
 120. According to a National Adoption Information Clearinghouse estimate, less 
than 14,000 children were voluntarily relinquished in the United States in 2003, and in 
1995 the number of American women seeking to adopt was over 200,000.  NAT’L 
ADOPTION INFO. CLEARINGHOUSE, VOLUNTARY RELINQUISHMENT FOR ADOPTION 1 (2005), 
http://childwelfare.gov/pubs/s_place.pdf [hereinafter VOLUNTARY RELINQUISHMENT];  NAT’L 
ADOPTION INFO. CLEARINGHOUSE, PERSONS SEEKING TO ADOPT 3 (2005), http://childwelfare. 
gov/pubs/s_seek.pdf [hereinafter PERSONS SEEKING TO ADOPT].  A large number of these 
would-be parents are looking for a “domestically born white baby.”  Samuels, supra note 
78, at 521.  The ratio of prospective adopters to available white American infants has 
been estimated at six-to-one.  Id. 
 121. Indeed, some argue that this imbalance between supply and demand justifies 
treating adoption as a “market” and allowing birth parents to negotiate for a variety of 
benefits, including compensation, in exchange for placing their child with a specific 
family.  Richard A. Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U. L. REV. 
59, 60–61 (1987).  Judge Posner also suggests that by providing an incentive for women 
to place children for adoption, payment could reduce the number of abortions and 
increase the available supply of infants for adoptions to everyone’s benefit.  Id. at 63–64. 
 122. Samuels, supra note 78, at 510–11. 




It is possible, though entirely speculative, that enforcing postadoption 
visitation agreements could deter some potential parents from adopting.  
However, the specter of a chilling effect should not cause much concern, 
at least under a law like California’s.  First, in California, postadoption 
contact agreements must be entered into voluntarily by all parties,123 so 
adopting parents can choose what, if any, degree of contact they are 
comfortable with, and select or negotiate with a birth mother accordingly.  
Second, not all birth mothers are interested in visitation.  Some may not 
be interested in ongoing contact at all.124  Third, the option of international 
adoption remains open to those who have difficulty connecting with a 
domestic birth mother with whom they can agree about ongoing contact.125
F.  Harassment and Adoption Revocation Concerns 
Some adopting parents shy away from open adoption because they 
worry that the birth parent will constantly besiege them,126 or, worse, 
will try to get the child back.127  It seems that a fear of some sort of 
harassment might have been the root of the California legislature’s 
concern in creating section 8616.5’s limitation on visitation where there 
was no existing relationship.  The bill analysis states that this provision 
of the statute is intended to “ensure[] that the child and the adoptive 
parents are not subjected to continuing contact with birth relatives with 
whom the child had no relationship at the time of adoption.”128
 123. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8616.5 (b)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.). 
 124. SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 83, at 156.  While this Comment agrees with the 
cited authors that ongoing contact is generally better for the child, the specific wants and 
needs of the individual parties involved in a particular adoption are important 
considerations as well.  This Comment advocates open adoptions only to the extent that 
they are truly voluntary for the parties involved. 
 125. Few international adoptions include birth parent contact.  While it is true that 
international adoption is more expensive, and therefore may not be available to all 
would-be parents, it is a viable alternative for many who prefer to avoid dealing with 
birth parents.  See Fleisher, supra note 117. 
 126. Baran & Pannor, supra note 8, at 328 (noting a common fear of “interference, 
intrusive behavior, and rivalry”). 
 127. A 2002 survey of adoption attitudes in America found that 82% of respondents 
would have a “major concern,” if they were planning to adopt, about “being sure that the 
birth parents could not take the child back.”  This would be a “minor concern” for 12% 
and “no concern at all” for only 6%.  HARRIS INTERACTIVE, NATIONAL ADOPTION ATTITUDES 
SURVEY 29 (2002), http://www.adoptioninstitute.org/survey/Adoption_Attitudes_ Survey.pdf.  
This fear persists even though most challenges to completed adoptions fail.  See Samuels, 
supra note 78, at 548–66 (recounting various failed attempts to challenge adoptions). 
 128. Minors: Adoptions/Dependent Children: Hearing on A.B. 2921 Before the S. 
Rules Comm., 1999–2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. 6 (Cal. 2000), available at CA B. An., A.B. 
2921 Sen., 8/22/2000 (Westlaw) (bill analysis commenting on purpose of legislation).  
The analysis provides no further elaboration on why being “subjected” to continuing 
contact might be bad.  Id. 
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The protections afforded by the current California statute should 
alleviate most harassment and adoption revocation concerns.  Birth 
relatives are unable to harass the adoptive parents by constantly dragging 
them to court to litigate the agreement.  The law provides that there can 
be no court enforcement unless there has first been a good faith effort at 
mediation,129 and the parties must pay their own mediation expenses.130  
If mediation fails and the matter goes before the court, the party bringing 
the action is responsible for all costs unless the other party is found to 
have violated the agreement without good cause.131  The law does not 
allow actions for monetary damages,132 and the court cannot order a 
burdensome investigation by a public or private agency absent a clear 
finding that it is necessary and is the only way to protect the child’s 
interests.133  Thus the cost of bringing a frivolous action is high and there 
is no possibility of monetary gain, so it is extremely unlikely that a birth 
parent could use the agreement in an unfairly harassing way.  Some 
adoptive parents may see any enforcement attempt as harassment.  But 
while a legitimate enforcement attempt may be an annoyance, it is one 
that the adoptive parents have bargained for.  If this is a concern for 
lawmakers, it would be better addressed by requiring counseling services 
and legal disclosures for adoptive parents similar to those required for 
birth parents134 to ensure that their decisions to agree to visitation are 
deliberate and fully informed. 
It should also be noted that the class of birth parents who are arguably 
the most likely to cause problems are already allowed to enter visitation 
agreements, if the adopting family consents.  Those who have had their 
children taken away because they are unstable, abusive, dependent on 
alcohol or drugs, or severely mentally ill will generally qualify as having 
an existing relationship with the child because the child lived with them 
prior to removal.135  In contrast, available data shows that most women 
 129. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8616.5(f) (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.). 
 130. Id. § 8616.5(i). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. § 8616.5(g). 
 133. Id. § 8616.5(f). 
 134. See infra text accompanying notes 194–208. 
 135. Because the California statute does not clearly define “existing relationship,” it 
is unclear what age a child must achieve to be considered capable of having a 
relationship.  According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 10% of 
children awaiting adoption in California foster care in 2003 were less than one year old.  
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD WELFARE OUTCOMES 2003, at VI-35 
(2003), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cwo03/cwo03.pdf.  This is the group 




who voluntarily relinquish infants at birth have both higher income and 
education levels and higher career and educational aspirations.136  Yet 
these are the birth parents excluded from visitation under the current 
law.137  If harassment is the concern, the choice of this population to 
exclude from visitation seems arbitrary at best. 
Still, some adoptive parents may be concerned that because women 
relinquishing at birth tend to be younger138 they may be less mature and 
therefore more inclined to change their minds and want their children 
back.  However, there is no empirical evidence to support this fear, and 
some experts believe that birth parents in open adoptions are better able 
to accept the situation than those who never get to see their children 
thriving in their new homes.139  And once an adoption is final, it is extremely 
unlikely to be reversed.140  This is particularly true in California because 
of the explicit terms of the postadoption contact agreement statute.  Its 
most important protection guarantees that the adoption cannot be set 
aside for failure to comply with a postadoption contact agreement.141  
Therefore a postadoption contact agreement poses no threat to the finality 
of an otherwise properly completed adoption. 
of children that seem most likely to be outside that definition.  In 2003, 35.8% of 
children awaiting adoption in California foster care were between one and five years-of-
age.  Id.  Some of these children would arguably have had existing relationships with 
their birth relatives at the time they were removed from their families.  The remaining 
54.2% of children on which data was provided were six years old or older and, 
depending on how long they had been in foster care, most of these children would likely 
have had “existing relationships” with their birth parents.  Id. 
 136. VOLUNTARY RELINQUISHMENT, supra note 120, at 1. 
 137. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8616.5 (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.) does not 
define “existing relationship,” but it seems clear that a child relinquished at birth is 
outside of the visitation provision.  For other states’ attempts to define the degree of 
relationship required, see IND. CODE ANN. § 31-19-16-2 (West, Westlaw through 2006 
Pub. Laws) (requiring that the child be “at least two (2) years of age” and that “there is a 
significant emotional attachment between the child and the birth parent”); LA. CHILD. 
CODE ANN. art. 1269.1 (West, Westlaw through 2006 Sess. Acts) (requiring “an established, 
significant relationship” whose loss “would cause substantial harm to the child”); R.I. 
GEN. LAWS § 15-7-14.1 (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation) (requiring “a significant 
emotional attachment between the child and the birth parent”). 
 138. Statistical information on birth parents is spotty and incomplete.  Most of the 
existing research focuses on unwed teen parents who relinquish their children at birth.  
Though these studies are most likely underinclusive, authorities seem to accept that these 
younger mothers make up the majority of those voluntarily relinquishing infants.  See 
VOLUNTARY RELINQUISHMENT, supra note 120, at 1. 
 139. SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 83, at 156 (“[B]irth mothers who choose open 
adoption may be better able to tolerate feelings of loss and ambivalence.  A mother can 
take great comfort in knowing her child as he or she grows up, while accepting that she 
cannot be the primary parent.”). 
 140. See Samuels, supra note 78, at 557–65 (reviewing cases from around the 
country in which birth mothers have sought, usually unsuccessfully, to set aside their 
consents to adoption). 
 141. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8616.5(e)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.). 
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G.  Protection of the New Family Unit and the New Parents’ Autonomy 
The third argument against broadening birth relative visitation 
agreements is that the newly formed family needs to be protected and 
allowed to develop as a natural family would.  Many courts, when refusing 
to enforce postadoption contact agreements, have reasoned that the 
agreements violate public policy by interfering with a new family unit 
that has all of the rights and obligations of a biological family unit.142  
For example, a Louisiana court taking this view stated: 
[A]doptive parents have the same right of custody and control of the child as if 
that child had been born to them and blood parents are relieved of all their legal 
duties and divested of all their legal rights in respect to the adopted child.  An 
agreement providing for visitation by a third party would impair the adoptive 
parents’ rights.  Such an agreement might also impair the new parent-child 
relationship with very undesirable consequences.143
However, this view of adoption is becoming increasingly anachronistic.144  
Since the mid-1970s, the adoption process has become increasingly 
open.  Most adoptive parents tell their adopted children about their 
biological origins,145 and adoption records are increasingly open.146  Both 
trends reflect that adoptive families no longer rely on the fiction that the 
child, in order to thrive, must be treated “as if that child had been born to 
 142. See, e.g., In re W.E.G., 710 P.2d 410, 415 (Alaska 1985) (“The theory of the 
adoption statute is that such welfare will be best promoted by giving an adopted child the 
status of a natural child . . . .  Public policy demands that an adoption carry with it a 
complete breaking of old ties . . . .”) (omissions in original) (quoting Browning v. 
Tarwater, 524 P.2d 1135, 1139 (Kan. 1974)); In re Adoption of Hammer, 487 P.2d 417, 
420 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971); In re Fox, 567 P.2d 985, 986 (Okla. 1977) (“The purpose of 
adoption proceedings is to terminate all legal relationships and rights between a minor 
child and its natural parents, and to establish these rights in the adoptive parents . . . .  
Public policy requires the severance of all old ties.”) (citing Browning, 524 P.2d 1135); 
Whetmore v. Fratello, 252 P.2d 1083, 1083 (Or. 1953) (“The principle underlying 
adoption is primarily to promote the welfare of the child, and, unquestionably, this would 
not be subserved by having a split relationship.”); Stickles v. Reichardt, 234 N.W. 728, 
730 (Wis. 1931); In re Adoption of RDS, 787 P.2d 968, 970 (Wyo. 1990). 
 143. Hill v. Moorman, 525 So. 2d 681, 681–82 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (citation omitted). 
 144. For example, since Hill Louisiana has adopted a statute similar to California’s 
allowing enforcement of some postadoption contact agreements.  LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. 
art. 1269.1 (West, Westlaw through 2006 Sess. Acts). 
 145. See E. WAYNE CARP, FAMILY MATTERS: SECRECY AND DISCLOSURE IN THE 
HISTORY OF ADOPTION 137 (1998). 
 146. WEGAR, supra note 73, at 17–20 (1997) (recognizing this trend although “most 
states and agencies have not unsealed their records.”). 




them.”147  Moreover, some studies indicate that adoptive families who 
acknowledge the differences inherent in their situation function better 
than those that deny them.148
Additionally, alternative family structures are becoming more common 
and accepted.  Experience with these different types of family structures 
shows that children are able to adjust to many kinds of complex extended 
family relationships, including open adoptions.149  The Connecticut Supreme 
Court observed as much in a case upholding an open adoption agreement: 
    Traditional models of the nuclear family have come, in recent years, to be 
replaced by various configurations of parents, stepparents, adoptive parents and 
grandparents.  We are not prepared to assume that the welfare of children is best 
served by a narrow definition of those whom we permit to continue to manifest 
their deep concern for a child’s growth and development.150
Still, many adoption professionals and commentators believe that the 
traditional nuclear family is the preferred setting for children,151 and they 
see enforcement of visitation rights for birth relatives as “inimical to the 
meaning of adoption, as creating ‘in all respects’ a new family to replace 
the child’s birth family.”152
Indeed, this is the primary reason that the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) chose not to require 
enforcement of most postadoption contact agreements in the Uniform 
Adoption Act (UAA).153  The UAA only provides for postadoption contact 
agreements in stepparent adoptions, because “stepparent adoption results 
in the creation of a legal family that comes as close as possible to the 
nuclear family.”154  However, the resistance to enforceable postadoption 
contact agreements among the drafters of the UAA is not simply about a 
preference for traditional families.  It also stems from a desire to allow 
the adoptive family to be “unfettered,”155 and to have the “new family 
protected by legal guarantees of privacy and autonomy.”156
 147. Hill, 525 So. 2d at 681. 
 148. See Kenneth Kaye, Acknowledgment or Rejection of Differences?, in THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOPTION, supra note 8, at 121, 121–22, 131–32 (discussing and 
updating the findings in H. DAVID KIRK, SHARED FATE (1964)). 
 149. SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 83, at 154–55. 
 150. Michaud v. Wawruck, 551 A.2d 738, 742 (Conn. 1988) (citations omitted). 
 151. Margaret M. Mahoney, Open Adoption in Context: The Wisdom and 
Enforceability of Visitation Orders for Former Parents Under Uniform Adoption Act        
§ 4-113, 51 FLA. L. REV. 89, 107 (1999). 
 152. Joan Heifetz Hollinger, The Uniform Adoption Act: Reporter’s Ruminations, 
30 FAM. L.Q. 345, 373 (1996). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Mahoney, supra note 151, at 107. 
 155. Hollinger, supra note 152, at 348. 
 156. Mahoney, supra note 151, at 99. 
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The United States Supreme Court has also stressed the importance of 
parental autonomy and freedom from interference.  In Troxel v. Granville157 
the Court invalidated a Washington State statute which permitted any 
person to petition the court for visitation of a child, and allowed a judge 
to order such visitation over a parent’s objections if the judge felt 
visitation was in the best interests of the child.158  In making this 
determination, the Court clarified that “it cannot now be doubted that the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the 
fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, 
custody, and control of their children.”159  The Court concluded that this 
right encompassed the power to make decisions about whether or not the 
child’s grandparents could have visitation.160
However, even if California expands its postadoption contact agreement, 
as this Comment recommends, the statute would not run afoul of the 
constitutional right of parents to make decisions about “the care, 
custody, and control of their children”161 because such agreements would be 
the result of voluntary decisions by the adoptive parents.  The Court 
stressed in Troxel that the Washington law was “breathtakingly broad” 
because “a parent’s decision that visitation would not be in the child’s 
best interest is accorded no deference” but rather “the best-interest 
determination [was placed] solely in the hands of the judge.”162  If 
California were to remove its restriction on visitation for birth relatives 
who did not have an existing relationship with the child, however, the 
adoptive families would still be deciding whether or not to allow 
visitation.163  Section 8616.5 does infringe upon adoptive parents’ autonomy 
to some extent by not allowing them to change their minds once they 
commit to allow visitation, but it reserves autonomy over that initial 
commitment.  The adoptive parents’ privacy will only be invaded to the 
degree they agree to visitation up front.  And, as has already been 
 157. 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 66. 
 160. Id. at 68. 
 161. Id. at 66. 
 162. Id. at 66–67. 
 163. While the statute at issue in Troxel, id. at 67, and the UAA’s stepparent 
visitation provision in Mahoney, supra note 151, at 96, both allow courts to issue visitation 
orders even where the adopting parent does not agree, the California postadoption 
contact agreement statute requires voluntary agreement.  CAL. FAM. CODE § 8616.5(a) 
(West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.).  This Comment does not advocate a change to 
that requirement. 




demonstrated, this limited invasion of autonomy is more than warranted 
by compelling public policy considerations.164
Of course, there may be situations where ongoing visitation will not 
work because of serious personality conflicts or birth relatives who 
exceed agreed-upon boundaries.  In these cases the adoptive parents and 
adopted child are protected by the requirement that the postadoption 
contact agreement be in the best interests of the child.165  If a birth relative’s 
behavior is unduly intrusive or disrupts the functioning of the new 
family, and attempts to mediate the problem fail, the adoptive parents 
can file for termination of the agreement on the grounds that such 
termination is in the child’s best interests.166  However, since the birth 
relatives’ involvement is often motivated by concern for the child, 
this will normally be unnecessary; the impact on the child and the 
potential loss of contact should be enough to inspire them to modify 
their behavior. 
Weighing the arguments for and against expansion of the visitation 
provision of section 8616.5 demonstrates that this expansion is both 
warranted and desirable.  However, in order for postadoption contact 
agreements to promote the State’s public policy goals, birth parents must 
be aware of their availability. 
IV.  THE CASE FOR NOTIFYING BIRTH PARENTS THAT                 
POSTADOPTION CONTACT IS AN OPTION 
Under the current law, however, there is no requirement that birth 
parents who are considering voluntarily relinquishing their children through 
private agency or independent adoptions be told of this option.167  California 
Court of Appeal cases indicate that this is because the legislature did not 
require notification168 and because the need for notification does not rise 
to the level of a due process right.169
The Court of Appeal has noted, however, that notice of the opportunity to 
form a contact agreement would often be appropriate and desirable.170  
State Senators agreed in the case of public agency adoptions.171  The 
 164. See supra Part III.A–D. 
 165. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8616.5(f) (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.). 
 166. Id. § 8616.5(h)(2)(A). 
 167. In re Zachary D., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 407 (Ct. App. 1999); In re Kimberly S., 83 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 740 (Ct. App. 1999). 
 168. See In re Kimberly S., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 747. 
 169. See In re Zachary D., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 408. 
 170. Id. at 408. 
 171. Dependent Children: Postadoption Contact Agreements: Hearing on S.B. 2157 
Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 1999–2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. 2 (Cal. 2000), available at 
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2000 amendments relating to postadoption contact agreements required 
that the social study conducted for the court in dependency cases address 
whether or not the social worker discussed a postadoption contact 
agreement with the child’s birth parents.172  The bill analysis stated that 
the purpose of this provision was to “ensure that birth parents are aware 
of this option, and thus perhaps alleviate their concerns and resistance to 
placing their child for adoption.”173  Votes on this version of the bill in 
the Senate were unanimously in its favor.174  These provisions are still in 
effect, but apply only in cases of adoptions of children who are dependents 
of the court.175  No attempt has been made to extend notification to birth 
parents outside the dependency system. 
California’s adoption laws do require that birth parents considering 
independent adoptions be informed of a host of other things before they 
consent to the adoption.176  These include: the alternatives to adoption;177 
the different types of adoption, including the applicable procedures and 
time frames;178 their right to separate legal counsel paid for by the 
adopting parents;179 and the right to counseling sessions paid for by the 
adopting parents.180  This information must be related by an adoption 
service provider181 in a face-to-face meeting in which the birth parent 
has the right to ask questions and have them answered.182  This meeting 
must occur at least ten days before the birth parent signs the adoption 
placement agreement.183  The adoption cannot be set aside for failure to 
follow this procedure, but such failure may give the birth parent a cause 
CA B. An., S.B. 2157 Sen., 3/28/2000 (Westlaw) (bill analysis commenting on purpose 
of legislation).
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Dependent Children: Postadoption Contact Agreements: Hearing on S.B. 2157 
Before the Assemb. Comm. on Human Servs., 1999–2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. 1 (Cal. 2000), 
available at CA B. An., S.B. 2157 Assem., 6/21/2000 (Westlaw); Dependent Children: 
Postadoption Contact Agreements: Hearing on S.B. 2157 Before the S. Rules Comm., 
1999–2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. 1 (Cal. 2000), available at CA B. An., S.B. 2157 Sen., 
4/04/2000 (Westlaw).
 175. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8715 (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.). 
 176. Id. § 8801.5. 
 177. Id. § 8801.5(c)(1). 
 178. Id. § 8801.5(c)(2). 
 179. Id. § 8801.5(c)(4). 
 180. Id. § 8801.5(c)(5). 
 181. Id. § 8801.5(a). 
 182. Id. § 8801.5(b). 
 183. Id. § 8801.3(b)(1). 




of action for negligence or malpractice against the adoption service 
provider.184  Thus, the statutory scheme ensures that the birth parent’s 
consent is informed while protecting the adoption from being overturned.185
The provision requiring the birth parent to be informed of the alternative 
types of adoption available186 could be interpreted to include a discussion of 
traditional closed adoption versus open adoption which would extend 
to a discussion of postadoption contact agreements.  However, this is 
not how the California Administrative Code interprets the provision.187  
Instead, the regulation defines this section as requiring an explanation of 
the legal types of adoption under the California system, such as standard 
agency relinquishment adoption,188 designated agency relinquishment 
adoption,189 and independent adoptions.190
V.  RECOMMENDED AMENDMENTS TO THE CALIFORNIA STATUTORY 
SCHEME FOR POSTADOPTION CONTACT AGREEMENTS 
Public policy considerations favor revising California Family Code 
section 8616.5 to allow visitation in all postadoption contact agreements.191  
Children’s best interests are served by allowing them to have relationships 
with birth relatives because this enables them to easily access information 
about their genealogical, personal, and medical histories, and to have a 
larger support network of people who love them.192  Birth parents’ 
well-being is protected when the law protects the adoptive placements in 
which they have carefully planned and invested.193  Fundamental principles 
of fairness are upheld by enforcing private agreements that have this 
level of personal significance and societal importance.194  Finally, the 
State’s interest in encouraging adoption is served by providing a more 
palatable alternative for individuals who want to give their children a 
 184. Id. § 8801.5(g). 
 185. Arguably, the State could go further in protecting birth parents in this regard.  
As Elizabeth Samuels notes in her excellent analysis of the consent process, though 
adoption laws attempt to advance two goals, “ensuring that birth parents make informed 
and deliberate decisions” and “protecting the finality of placements,” the latter often takes 
precedent.  Samuels, supra note 78. 
 186. CAL. FAM. CODE  §  8801.5(c)(2). 
 187. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 35094.2 (2005). 
 188. Id. § 35094.2(c)(3)(A). 
 189. Id. § 35094.2(c)(3)(B). 
 190. Id. § 35094.2(c)(3)(C), (c)(3)(D). 
 191. See supra Part III. 
 192. See supra Part III.A. 
 193. See supra Part III.B. 
 194. See supra Part III.C. 
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chance for a stable family life that they cannot currently provide, but 
who cannot bring themselves to completely sever all ties to their child.195
Therefore, the legislature should eliminate section 8616.5(b)(3), which 
limits postadoption contact agreements to “the sharing of information 
about the child unless the child has an existing relationship with the birth 
relative.”196  This simple amendment will allow birth parents and adopting 
parents to negotiate the level of contact they find appropriate without any 
arbitrary restrictions.  It would leave intact the protections already provided 
to adoptive parents and adopted children197 while helping California to 
promote its interest in encouraging adoptions.198
The California legislature also should amend California Family Code 
section 8801.5199 and its interpreting regulation200 to require that birth 
parents be specifically told that they have a right to negotiate with the 
adoptive parent for ongoing contact with or regarding the child.  The 
amendment should also require that birth parents be told that if the 
agreement meets the statutory requirements it will be enforceable, but 
that the adoption cannot be revoked for failure to comply with an 
otherwise valid agreement.201  This will allow the legislature to encourage 
adoption by increasing awareness of arrangements that may make adoption 
a more palatable option for many birth parents.  It will also reduce the 
risk that birth parents will regret or contest adoptions by empowering 
birth parents to make fully informed choices about the placement of their 
children.202
Proactively informing birth parents is important because most people 
who find themselves involved in an unwanted pregnancy know little or 
nothing about the law in this area,203 and birth parents are not required to 
be represented by their own counsel.204  Although they must be informed 
of their right to have the adopting parents pay for separate counsel, they 
may be too overwhelmed or too trusting of the adopting parents to assert 
 195. See supra Part III.D. 
 196. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8616.5(b)(3) (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.). 
 197. See supra text accompanying notes 44–54. 
 198. See supra Part III.D. 
 199. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8801.5 (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.). 
 200. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 35094.2 (2005). 
 201. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8616.5 (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.). 
 202. See Samuels, supra note 78, at 512. 
 203. Pamela K. Strom Amlung, Comment, Conflicts of Interest in Independent Adoptions: 
Pitfalls for the Unwary, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 169, 171 (1990). 
 204. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 8627, 8800 (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.). 




that right.  Even in cases where the adopting parents do pay for separate 
counsel, the attorney will have a potential conflict of interest and may 
not feel comfortable advocating options to which the adopting parents 
would be adverse.205  The State already seems to acknowledge birth parents’ 
general lack of knowledge of the law when it requires the disclosures 
described above.206  Requiring information about postadoption contact 
agreements to be included in these disclosures would further ensure that 
consents are fully informed. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
California has enacted a progressive statute that encourages adoptions 
by recognizing the legitimate needs and desires of adoptees and birth 
relatives for ongoing contact.  However, the current statute draws an 
unnecessary, arbitrary line by preventing birth relatives who do not have 
an existing relationship from having postadoption visitation.  The California 
legislature should amend California Family Code section 8616.5 to 
abolish this limitation and amend California Family Code section 8801.5 
to require that birth parents be informed regarding postadoption contact 
agreements.  With these changes, California’s law can serve as a model for 
legislatures across the country and demonstrate how they can balance the 
needs of all those involved in the adoption process: adoptive parents, 









 205. While the Model Rules of Professional Conduct do permit a lawyer to accept 
payment from a third party, they also acknowledge the potential conflict of interest this 
can create and require the lawyer to get informed consent to the conflict if the risk is 
“significant.”  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 13 (2005).  Samuels notes 
that adoption is a $2 billion a year industry and that money comes almost entirely from 
adoptive parents.  See Samuels, supra note 78, at 518–25.  As such, social workers and 
attorneys may feel compelled to favor the paying customer, rather than the usually 
economically disadvantaged birth parents. 
 206. See supra text accompanying notes 176–85. 
